Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis by Tazdaït, Tarik et al.
Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis
Tarik Tazda¨ıt, Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Chrsitophe Pe´reau
To cite this version:
Tarik Tazda¨ıt, Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Chrsitophe Pe´reau. Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolu-
tion Analysis. 2008. <halshs-00275386>
HAL Id: halshs-00275386
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00275386
Submitted on 23 Apr 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
Mutual Aid: an Indirect Evolution Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Alejandro CAPARRÓS 
Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), Institute for Public Goods and Policies (IPP). 
Albasanz 26, 3E4. 28037 Madrid.  
 
Jean-Christophe PEREAU  
University of Marne-la-Vallée - O.E.P,  Cité Descartes, 5 boulevard Descartes, Champs Sur 
Marne, 77454 Marne-la-Vallée cedex 2, France. E-mail: pereau@univ-mlv.fr. Tel: 
+3360957058. Fax: +33160957050. And C.N.R.S - E.H.E.S.S - CIRED 
 
Tarik TAZDAÏT  
C.N.R.S - E.H.E.S.S - CIRED,  Jardin Tropical - 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 
Nogent Sur Marne cedex, France. 
 
 
Abstract. 
This paper studies the concept of “mutual aid” developed by Kropotkin, which implies 
cooperation as a strategic choice. We study this concept in a Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma 
in a non-cooperative framework and in an indirect evolution framework (with complete and 
incomplete information). We systematically compare this game with one that models Kant’s 
moral. In the non-cooperative framework both moral concepts imply multiple equilibria. In 
the indirect evolution framework with complete information Kropotkin´s moral concept leads 
to generalized cooperation, while Kant’s rules lead towards general defection. In the indirect 
evolution framework with incomplete information both moral approaches favor selfishness. 
However, if some agents have an imperfect detection technology cooperative behavior will 
not disappear in Kropotkin’s case, while it will vanish with Kant’s morality. 
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1. Introduction 
Many authors have argued that morality could solve problems for which individually 
rational actions lead to ineffective collective solutions, as in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). 
Morality is analyzed in economics mainly focusing on philosophical references, such as 
Kant’s categorical imperative (Laffont, 1975; Etzioni, 1987; Bordignon, 1990, Bergstrom, 
1995, Roemer, 1996, among others). An alternative approach is proposed by Becker (1974, 
1981), who explains cooperation by supposing altruistic individuals. However, Becker also 
treats altruism as a moral issue, although not explicitly. In any case, in these approaches 
motivations and behaviors merge (Ballet, 2000) and the analysis focuses on behavior, 
forsaking connections between motivations and behavior. 
On the contrary, the concept of cooperation developed by Kropotkin (1902) in 
“Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution” has not deserved the attention that it probably merits 
(Fong, Bowles and Gintis, 2006). This author studies the importance of mutual-aid in human 
evolution. Analyzing Siberian tribes, Polynesian islanders, medieval corporations and 
incipient industrial societies, Kropotkin stresses the importance of the mutual-aid principle.  
Since the Stone Age, mutual-aid was essential for survival and progress, leading men to live 
in tribes and clans. Men soon developed a great number of social institutions which 
determined the main features of progress: collective hunting, collective defense or collective 
possession of territories. As new needs came up, villages, cities and finally States appeared. 
For Kropotkin, the mutual aid principle, transmitted as a heritage of a very long evolution, is 
strong enough to survive even under the most authoritative forms of State. Although 
Kropotkin by no means denies the importance of the “individual ego”, for him, progress 
results from the capacity of the mutual aid principle to counter-balance the “individual ego”. 
In Kropotkin’s analysis cooperation is a strategic choice, and not a direct result of 
moral considerations (as it is with Kant’s rules). The agent arbitrates between individual 
interest (selfishness) and cooperation (the mutual aid principle). Depending on the context, 
this may lead to cooperation.  More precisely, in certain economic situations, individuals will 
widen their space of strategies, including elements able to promote cooperation, to overcome 
dead-ends created by individualistic behaviors. 
A similar idea can be found in Margolis (1982). According to this author, individuals 
act as if their interest would be referred to larger entities than themselves. They appear to act, 
not according to their own interest, but according to the interest of the community. He adds 
that only under this condition society can emerge. A similar idea can be found in the “we-
intentions” defined in Tuomela and Miller (1988) or in the “joint goals” in Tuomela (1990).  
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Thus, for some authors, agents are not only guided by selfishness. They are supposed 
to arbitrate between their personal interest and a more general benefit. Of course, this implies 
a particular form of preferences, not only restricted to individual interests, but including a 
collective aspect. To study this form of cooperation we analyze Kropotkin’s mutual aid 
concept as a “feeling1” favoring cooperation in a sequential prisoner´s dilemma (SPD). We 
study this SPD in an indirect evolution framework in which cooperative equilibria can emerge 
via evolutionary rather than strategic considerations. The indirect evolution approach allows 
endogenous derivation of preferences (Güth and Yaari, 1992; Güth and Kliemt, 1992; 
Köningstein and Müller, 2000; Berninghaus et al., 2003; Güth and Napel, 2006), and can be 
seen as a generalization of rational choice models, which usually take preferences as given. In 
this approach, short-run decisions are taken rationally (i.e. maximizing a utility function that 
incorporates monetary and non-monetary elements) while evolutionary success is exclusively 
given by the monetary payoff2. Thus, preferences for monetary payoffs are stable (including 
the standard assumption that more is preferred to less), although moral preferences (related to 
the non-monetary part of the utility functions) may vary (for a general analysis of the impact 
of incomplete information in these type of models see Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) and 
Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007)). It is not easy to evaluate the real-life pertinence of this 
assumption, since moral preferences are difficult to observe. Nevertheless, an interesting 
parallel can be made with the choice of religion. Each religion imposes a given set of moral 
principles which may impact our utility function. However, if we observe that people of other 
religions systematically perform better in monetary terms (or have a better social 
consideration) we may change our religion. In historical terms, fluctuations in dominant 
religions in a given country have been constant and, not always, associated with violent 
imposition. Thus, the assumption that changes in religion (or in other set of moral rules) are 
driven by imitation (i.e. following an evolutionary pattern) is reasonable. Of course, the 
assumption that agents maximize their utility (incorporating elements imposed by their 
religion or moral code) in the short run is also perfectly reasonable. 
                                               
1 In “Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution” Kropotkin (1902) uses the term “mutual aid” in opposition to 
selfishness. He uses, among other expressions, the mutual aid “tendency”, “feeling” or “instinct”. 
2 It is not essential to the indirect evolution approach to impose monetary payoff as the indicator of evolutionary 
success, it is enough to consider that short-run strategic decisions are taken maximizing utility and that 
evolutionary success is given by a different measure. However, most applications have used monetary success as 
the measure of evolutionary success (Köningstein and Müller, 2000). Nevertheless, “social success” could also 
be seen as the measure of evolutionary success. 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is usually the starting point of most literature devoted to 
study paradoxes associated with the absence of cooperation3. Nevertheless, in most real-life 
situations decisions are not absolutely simultaneous, but sequential. In addition, as 
Hirschleifer (1987, 2001) shows, most relevant economic situations are characterized by a 
sequential decision process in which some individuals have psychological predispositions to 
start relations. For Frank (1987), these predispositions are related to the emotions felt by the 
individual in a given context. Therefore, in situations where these predispositions are relevant, 
human relations take the form of a sequential commitment game. Hence, we use in our 
analysis a sequential PD (SPD) and not a standard PD. The SPD-version that we propose is 
extended to include Kropotkin´s mutual aid concept. In addition, we propose an extension of 
the SPD to include Kant´s moral rules in order to compare the implications of both moral 
concepts. That is, cooperation as a choice in Kropotkin and as a duty in Kant. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section (2) presents and compares, in a non-
cooperative framework, the SPD game extended to Kropotkin’s and Kant’s moral concepts. 
Section (3) analyses these games in an indirect evolution framework. We show that 
cooperation and generalized acceptation of Kropotkin’s mutual aid principle can be an 
evolutionary equilibrium, while this is not possible with Kantian morality. Section (4) proofs 
that, in an indirect evolution framework with incomplete information, neither Kropotkin’s nor 
Kantian moralities are likely to be the outcome since general defection will be the rule. 
However, section (5) shows that if some agents have an imperfect detection technology, moral 
agents and cooperative behavior will not disappear under Kropotkin’s morality, while they 
will vanish with Kant’s rules. Section (6) concludes.  
 
2. The extended SPD-game with rational agents 
 
The basic SPD-game is shown in figure (1) in its extensive form game. The first monetary 
payoff at each end node corresponds to the first mover, the second to the second mover. The 
two options of player i (i=1,2) may be interpreted as "cooperation" ( iC ) and "defection" 
( iD ). We assume that the payoffs are ranked as follows: S´ < P´ < R´ < T´, and that they 
                                               
3 We will focus in our analysis on a Prisoniers’s Dilemma without exit option. Vanberg and Congleton (1992) 
have shown, by means of simulations, that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in 
response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including 
Tit for Tat, if an exit option is available in the Prisonier’s Dilemma.  
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satisfy: (S´+T´)/2 < R´. Without loss of generality, we normalize the payoffs so as to set S = 0 
(i.e. X X S   ,   , , ,X S P R T     ).  
 
     1 
           
     1D          1C    
 
              2  2 
     2D       2C  2D      2C  
      
               
    P´         T´  S´        R´ 
    P´         S´   T´        R´ 
 
Figure (1). The SPD-game 
 
Whatever j chooses, the best response of agent i, i  j, is iD . Hence, the only rational 
solution is )D,D( 21 . This result in complete information does not depend on the timing but on 
the assumption that both player utilities are strictly monotonic functions of the monetary 
payoffs. 
As stated above, Kropotkin´s mutual aid concept must be able to restrain the 
individual “ego” (i.e. the egoistic character of the individual). If the agent has the mutual aid 
pre-disposition he will feel bad if, by privileging his selfishness, he betrays his partner while 
this one seeks cooperation. Thus, we will assume that the payoff T is associated with an 
internal feeling (e) that will be strong for an individual with the mutual aid pre-disposition and 
week (or zero) for an individual who does not have this pre-disposition. However, if the 
partner chooses D, Kropotkin´s mutual aid idea does not imply to “take a sacrifice” for others. 
Kroportkin’s mutual aid asks to support cooperation when this outcome is possible, but it 
does not mean an unconditional commitment to cooperate. Hence, the utilities are now 
functions of both the monetary payoff and the feeling associated with the mutual aid principle. 
Figure (2) shows what we will call “Kropotkin’s SPD”. 
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1 
           
     1D          1C    
 
              2  2 
      2D       2C   2D      2C  
      
               
    P   T+ 1e    0        R 
    P          0   T+ 2e         R 
 
  Figure (2). Kropotkin’s SPD 
 
The preference parameter ie is internal to the actors and is not influenced by the monetary 
payoff. Without loss of generality, we define ie  as follows
4:  T+ ie
  < R < T+ ie
 , i = 1,2. 
Remark that ie
  implies a “moral” concern that changes the initial relation T>R, while ie
   
implies no moral concern, or a moral concern too small to change this initial relation between 
the monetary payoffs. Therefore, we will call ie
 -agents “moral agents” (in Kropotkin´s sense) 
and  ie
  -agents  “amoral agents” (in the sense of being insufficiently motivated by morals to 
change their behavior).  
The rational behavior in the new game depends on the values of ie . In a situation 
where 2e = 2e
 , the strategy combination )D,D( 21  is the single subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game. As usual, we start examining the game at the second stage. At this step, only agent 
2 plays. Acting rationally, he chooses the strategy that ensures the highest payoff, in this case 
P if agent 1 plays 1D , and T+ 2e
  if agent 1 chooses 1C . Consequently, agent 2's best response 
is to play 2D . Knowing that agent 2 will play 2D , agent 1 will choose 1D  because he prefers 
to obtain P rather than 0. On the other hand, 2e = 2e
  implies that the single subgame perfect 
equilibrium is )C,C( 21 . In this case, players reach a Pareto-efficient result yielding a gain of R 
                                               
4 Our game implies, to some extent, to define the intervals most likely to support cooperation. Kirchkamp 
(1996), for example, developed simulations with the repeated PD where constraints are defined on the values of 
the profits.  In this study, T´=1 and P´=0, whereas the values of R´ and S´ vary within the limits of the intervals 
given by:  0 < R´ < 1 and -2,5 < S´ < 0.  Kirchkamp´s results are related to a great number of simulations in the 
R´x S´ space.  The only strategies available are “always defect” and “always cooperate”. He shows that mutual 
cooperation appears only for R´ > 0,7 and S´ > -1, while universal defection prevails otherwise. Simulations by 
other authors confirm the result that cooperation can be promoted by suitable modifications of the profits. To 
obtain this result, the values of R´ and S´ must be as high as possible within the constraints that define the PD. 
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for each. Thus, we obtain a stategy similar to Tit For Tat (Axelrod, 1980), i.e. agents answer 
cooperation with cooperation and defection with defection. 
We will now exceed the requirements of the mutual-aid principle and evoke a more 
demanding framework: Kant’s (1785/1965) categorical imperative. According to Kant, it is 
possible to determine moral principles able to control our behavior towards others. Each agent 
must put himself at the place of the others so as to identify his duties towards them and, a 
fortiori, towards himself. Whatever his objective may be, whatever desires he may feel, 
whatever inclinations he may have, if he wants to act morally, he has to conform his act to the 
categorical imperative (or the “imperative of duty”): “Act only on that maxim whereby thou 
canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785/1965). Since 
the outcome of generalized cooperation is preferred to the one associated to generalized 
defection, players would wish cooperation to become a universal law (Sugden, 1991). Thus, 
they have to cooperate. Therefore, cooperation is a duty and not a choice in response to a 
given environmental situation. In the SPD that means, for both players, that “bad feelings” do 
not only appear if they betray a partner who cooperates, but in all situations where they do not 
follow their moral duty to cooperate. Thus, the parameter (e) also modifies the utility P that 
agents obtain if both choose defection. Figure (3) gives the extensive form of what we will 
call a “Kantian SPD”. 
      1 
           
     1D          1C    
 
              2  2 
      2D       2C   2D      2C  
      
               
    P+ 1e    T+ 1e    0        R 
    P+ 2e           0   T+ 2e         R 
 
  Figure (3). Kantian SPD 
 
The assumptions of the game are now:  T+ ie
  < R < T+ ie
  and  P+ ie
  < 0 < P+ ie
 , i = 1,2. In 
this context, ie
  implies a moral concern that changes the initial relation T>R and also the 
relation P>0, while ie
  implies no moral concern, or a moral concern too small to change this 
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initial relation between the payoffs. Thus, we will call an ie
 -agent a “moral” agent (in Kant´s 
sense) and an ie
 -agent an “amoral” agent (as in the previous game). 
It is easy to show that if 2e = 2e
 , then: (i) for 1e = 1e
 , )D,D( 21  is the only subgame perfect 
equilibrium; (ii) for 1e = 1e
 , )D,C( 21  is the only subgame perfect equilibrium. On the  
contrary, if 2e = 2e
 , then: (i) for 1e = 1e
 , )C,D( 21  is the only subgame perfect equilibrium; (ii)  
for 1e = 1e
 , )C,C( 21  is the only subgame perfect equilibrium. As it can be seen, the actions of 
the two types of agents are only determined by their own type, and have no relation with the 
actions undertaken by their partner. Thus, we can write the following remark: 
 
Remark 1 
In a Kantian SPD, a moral agent ( ie
 -agent) will always cooperate and an amoral agent ( 1e
 -
agent) will always defect.  
 
That is, a “moral” agent in the sense of Kant (an ie
 -agent) will always do what he 
would like to be the universal law, i.e. to cooperate since this would yield the highest benefit 
if followed by all players. However, as a direct result of remark 1, mutual cooperation only 
appears if both agents are ie
 . Therefore, with Kant’s categorical imperative all the outcomes 
of the game can be equilibrium solutions, depending upon the types of the agents involved in 
the game.  
Within the non-cooperative framework we could, modifying the game, ensure 
cooperation irrespective of players' characteristics. We could, for instance, assume the 
existence of norms (Bendor and Swistak, 2002) or other forms of external punishment. 
However, if we include norms in the analysis we exclude de facto the possibility that agents 
develop a cooperative preference due to internal moral concerns. However, experimental 
economics has shown that such a preference for cooperation may in fact exist (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Sandbu, 2002). Thus, we should only take into account elements which are 
internal to the agents. Our aim is to explain if Kropotkin’s and/or Kant’s moral rules can favor 
global cooperation, and under which conditions, and the evolutionary game-theory framework 
is well adapted for this task, especially in a context with indirect evolution. This latter 
approach, applying the ESS concept to preferences rather than to strategies, permits to 
determine preferences endogenously. 
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3. Indirect evolution 
 
Since we are now in an evolutionary game-theory framework we assume a large 
random-mixing population. Agents engage only in sequential symmetric pairwise contests. 
One player is labeled player 1 and the other player 2.  
Define iE =  ,i ie e   as the set of values that the parameter ie of agent i can take (i = 
1,2). Each one of these two values describes a type of agent. That is, as in the previous 
section, agents are either amoral ( ie
 ) or moral ( ie
 ), in Kropotkin’s or Kant’s sense 
(depending on the game under consideration). To ensure a symmetric game, the position in 
the game of both players is random. Thus, Nature (agent 0) defines this position. Without loss 
of generality, we consider that the probability for each agent to play first is ½. The 
symmetrical extensive form associated with this new version of the game is described by 
figure (4) for Kropotkin’s SPD. We will use the ESS concept, as defined by Maynard Smith 
and Price (1973), since it is one of the most widely used concepts of evolutionary game 
theory.  
           0 
 
     ½          ½ 
 
 
    1     2   
   1D        1C         2D         2C   
            
            
   2           2   1    1  
  2D      2C   2D      2C     1D         1C    1D          1C  
            
  P T+ 1e  0       R  P          0      T+ 1e  R 
  P      0 T+ 2e        R  P  T+ 2e        0   R 
            
  Figure (4). Symmetric Kroportkin’s SPD 
 
 
Definition 1 
Given two strategies 1e  and 2e , )e,e(U 21  is the utility that agent 1 obtains by choosing 
1e while the other player chooses 2e . A monomorphic population (i.e, when all components of 
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the population use the same strategy) is stable if and only if all agents adopt a strategy 1e  
that meets the two following conditions (for i = 1,2): 
 1. Equilibrium condition: )e,e(U 11  ≥ )e,e(U 12  2e  
 2. Stability condition: if 2e  1e  and  )e,e(U 11  = )e,e(U 12 ,  then  )e,e(U 21 > )e,e(U 22  . 
 
Definition 2 
If 1e  satisfies conditions (1) and (2), we say that 1e  constitutes an ESS. 
 
That is, a given behavior is evolutionary stable within a population if no other strategy 
can make a better score playing against 1e  than 1e  itself, and, at the same time, if 1e cannot 
do better against itself than 2e , then 1e makes a  better score against 2e  than 2e  itself.  
Thus, the analysis of the game consists in studying the evolutionary stability of the 
preference parameter "e". Consequently, the evolutionary approach consists in determining 
)e,e(U 21  for 1e  1 1,e e   for agent 1 and 2e  2 2,e e   for agent 2. Note that this discussion 
is analogous to section (2). However, results depend not only on each agent's type, but also on 
its position within the game. Thus, we obtain the following bimatrix, showing the expected 
gain of each type of agent. 
 
    2e
     2e
  
  1e
   R,R   (P+R)/2 , (P+R)/2 
 
  1e
   (P+R)/2 , (P+R)/2  P,P 
 
Figure (5) Expected gains in Kropotkin’s symmetric SPD  
 
This bimatrix is obtained repeating the following reasoning for the different 
combinations of “e”. Consider the case where 1e = 1e
  and 2e = 2e
 . With a probability ½ agent 
1 will open the game. In this case, the perfect equilibrium will be )C,C( 21 , and gains (R,R). If 
agent 2 opens the game, the perfect equilibrium will also be )C,C( 21 , and gains also (R,R).  
Thus )e,e(U 21  = R/2 + R/2 = R. Since R > P, it is easy to show that the payoffs of 1 are higher 
for ie = ie
  than for ie = ie
 . Hence, we can write: 
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Proposition 1 
When players can identify their opponent's type in Kropotkin’s symmetric SPD, ie
  is the only 
evolutionarily stable strategy. 
 
Proof: direct from figure (5). 
 
According to proposition (1), starting form a situation where moral (in Kropotkin’s 
sense) and amoral agents exist, moral agents will impose themselves and morality will spread. 
The drawback is that this result is related to the fact that information is complete. The first 
mover knows the characteristics of his partner, and will thus adapt his strategy. Since 
encounters between moral agents yield a higher utility than encounters between amoral 
agents, the learning process will imply for amoral agents to develop morality. 
This result is not completely new. Within a different framework, Gauthier (1986) 
arrived to a similar conclusion. One of Gauthier’s interesting intuitions is to suppose that it 
can be rational for agents to choose certain pre-dispositions before the game starts.  These 
pre-dispositions act as constraints on the set of possible actions of the actors. Gauthier 
considers two types of strategies: individual strategies associated to players maximizing their 
individual profit, and joint strategies associated to players maximizing the collective profit. 
The model also includes two types of actors: (i) “direct” maximizers, who only seek to 
maximize their own utility (these agents betray in the one-shot PD), and (ii) “constraint” 
maximizers (they choose a joined strategy if the profit is equal to or higher than the one 
associated to an individual strategy). Introducing these two behaviors in a static PD he shows 
that choosing a constraint maximization is a rational act, which supports mutual cooperation. 
Our result is equivalent, although we consider a SPD and do not consider pre-dispositions as 
given. However, the similarity of the results obtained suggests that cooperation is not due to 
sequentiallity but to complete information. 
It is interesting to remark that the evolutionary framework analyzed in this paper does 
yield a similar, but not identical, result to Becker’s (1974) “rotten kid theorem”. Becker 
studies a game with two players where one of the actors is altruistic. He shows that even if the 
recipient of the altruistic behavior adopts an egoistic behavior, he will not harm his 
benefactor.  Suppose that an action increases the income of the recipient and reduces that of 
the altruist. The altruist, taking into account the reduction of his income, may reduce his 
contribution more than what the recipient would gain. In other words, even an egoist 
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internalizes the benefit that he can obtain from his benefactor. That is, the altruist pushes 
indirectly the other individual to maximize the altruist’s income, but the latter does not 
become an altruist (Becker (1974) calls this the “rotten kid theorem”).  This result is based on 
given preferences and individuals, taking into account their preferences, can only choose the 
strategies imposed by their rationality.  In the indirect evolution framework, individuals have 
a broader choice, they can build their preferences. By learning from others, they can 
determine the best preferences to establish a social link based on reciprocity and cooperation. 
Evolutionary forces will determine not only the behavior but also the non-monetary 
preferences that are more convenient. With complete information the answer is clear: morality 
in Kropotkin’s sense (i.e. mutual-aid) is better than amorality (i.e. selfishness). Thus, by 
permitting egoists to re-examine their concept of social relations, they will (progressively) 
become more and more moral (in Kropotkin’s sense). 
The symmetrical extensive form of the SPD with agents guided by Kant´s categorical 
imperative is shown in figure (6). Following the same type of reasoning as for figure 5, we 
obtain figure (7). However, using remark 1 the same result can be obtained more directly.  
 
           0 
 
     ½          ½ 
 
 
    1     2   
   1D        1C         2D         2C   
            
            
   2           2   1    1  
  2D      2C   2D      2C     1D         1C    1D          1C  
            
  P+ 1e  T+ 1e  0       R  P+ 1e           0      T+ 1e  R 
  P+ 2e       0 T+ 2e        R  P+ 2e   T+ 2e        0   R 
            
  Figure (6) Symmetric Kantian SPD  
 
    2e
     2e
  
  1e
   R,R              0,T 
 
  1e
   T,0                        P,P 
 
Figure (7) Expected gains in the Kantian symmetric SPD  
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This permits us to write the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2 
When players can identify their opponent's type in a symmetric Kantian SPD, ie
  is the only 
evolutionarily stable strategy. 
 
Proof: direct from figure (7). 
 
That is, although moral agents in the Kantian SPD have a higher level of commitment 
in favor of cooperation than in Kropotkin’s SPD, the Kantian SPD brings us back to the 
standard prisoner’s dilemma. Hence, the Kantian requirement, by setting cooperation as a 
duty, encourages others to defection and not to cooperation and obtains the opposite result to 
that what it pretended to promote (i.e. in equilibrium all agents are amoral ( ie
 )). In order to 
study the robustness of our results, we are now going to analyze the same models with 
incomplete information. This will enable us to find a strategic dimension in the sequentiallity.  
 
4. Indirect evolution with incomplete information about the partner’s type 
 
Let q denote the share of e  type agents in the population and (1-q) the share of e  
type agents, with 0  q 1. We assume that the probability distribution (q,1-q) is common 
knowledge. Moreover, we assume that players know their own type, but not the type of their 
partners. The probability of playing first (or second) is for each player ½ (independently of 
their type). 
In Kropotkin’s SPD, the optimal decision of the second mover does not depend on the 
type of the first, but on his behavior. Thus, the second mover's information set becomes 
strategically irrelevant and we can predict the second player's behaviour. If he is an ie
  type 
agent (a moral agent in Kropotkin’s sense), he will use strategy iC  if the first player chooses 
jC , and strategy iD  if the first player's choice is jD , i  j. If he is a ie  type agent (an amoral 
agent), he will always choose iD , i = 1,2. 
By retracing the development of the game one stage we examine the choice made by 
the first mover. Irrespective of his type, the first mover chooses to cooperate if: q > P/R. 
Suppose that an agent 1 of type 1e
  chooses C. There is a probability q that agent 2 will be of 
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type 2e
 . Since a 2e
 -agent 2 will adopt strategy 2C , agent 1 will obtain R with a probability q. 
If faced with an agent 2 of type 2e
  (with probability 1-q), agent 1 will receive 0. If agent 1 
chooses 1D , the gain would be P if faced with an agent 2 of type 2e
  (with probability q), but 
also when matched with an agent 2 of type 2e
  (with probability 1-q). Therefore, 1C  is more 
beneficial than 1D  if qR >P. Since the same results can be found for an 1e
  agent playing first 
(owing to the fact that T does not intervene in the argument) the first mover will choose iC  if 
q > P/R regardless of his type. Conversely, he will prefer iD  if: q < P/R. 
However, if we wish to characterize the expected utility by each of these two types, we 
must study if the parameter values are linked to the first or the second condition as determined 
above. Consider q > P/R. With probability ½ an agent i of type ie
  (i = 1,2) will be assigned 
the role of first mover. By choosing iC  (owing to the initial condition) his gain is qR . 
However, with probability ½ he will play the game as a second mover. We know that an agent 
i of type ie
  playing second will choose iC  rather than iD (obtaining R). Thus, the expected 
gain for an ie
  agent is: 1/2[qR + R]. If agent i is of type ie
 , he will play first with probability 
½ and get a gain of qR. If he plays second (with probability ½), it will be more beneficial for 
him to choose iD  rather than iC , since this choice yields a gain of T. Hence, the expected 
gain for type ie
  is: 1/2[qR + T]. Thus, the expected gain associated with type e  is superior 
to the one of type e  (given T > R). If we adopt a similar reasoning for the case where q < 
P/R, we note that the first mover will choose D, and so will do the second mover (and both 
would obtain a benefit equal to P). Therefore, we can write: 
 
Proposition 3 
In Kroportkines’s SPD with incomplete information concerning agents' type, no population 
containing a proportion 1>q > P/R of e  type agents can be evolutionarily stable. 
 
According to proposition (3), if amoral agents appear in a population formed only by 
moral agents (in Kropotkin’s sense) the cooperative behavior will be significantly reduced. As 
amoral agents appear, they will be more and more encouraged since they obtain higher 
(monetary) payoffs than moral agents. However, if the proportion of moral agents is lower 
than P/R, the evolutionary pressure plays no role anymore and first movers will always 
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choose D. Thus, moral agents (with the mutual aid pre-disposition) will not disappear; they 
will just become a minority. Nevertheless, the outcome will be generalized defection (since 
even moral agents will choose to betray in this environment dominated by amoral agents). 
In the case where q < P/R we are confronted with a problem (since payoffs are equal).  
However, Selten (1988) proposes to modify the game slightly in such a case.  The idea is that, 
in a complex universe, agents may make errors in choosing their behavior. This implies to 
substitute the concept of ESS with that of limit ESS (LESS), which associates errors with 
probabilistic disturbances. 
Consider a modified game where strategy C can be adopted with a probability   by 
the player who opens the game, where 0  .  The expected gain for a e -agent is now 
1( ) (1 ) ( ) / 2E e P qR R 
     . For an e -agent the expected gain is 
1( ) (1 ) ( ) / 2E e P qR T 
     . Since, by assumption, R < T, the expected profit of a e -
agent is higher than the one of a e -agent. Thus, as long as the strategy C can be selected 
(even with an arbitrarily small probability) only a e -monomorphic population (only amoral 
agents) is evolutionary stable, within the LESS concept. Hence: 
 
Proposition 4 
In Kroportkines’s SPD with incomplete information concerning agents' type, only a e -
monomorphic population is limit evolutionarily stable.      
         
Thus, information is the main element determining agents’ behavior in Kropotkin’s 
SPD. If the individuals know each others type before the game starts, then cooperation is 
evolutionary stable. On the other hand, with incomplete information or, more precisely, when 
agents do not know precisely the type of their partners, the first mover will not take the risk to 
cooperate. That is, evolution supports selfishness if information is not complete. In this 
context, selfishness is not the will to benefit from the benevolence of others; it is more a way 
of protection against the uncertainty related to asymmetric information. Thus, selfishness is 
more a form of fear. 
Retracing the same argument for the Kantian SPD we will start by analyzing the 
decision of the first mover. In the case of the Kantian SPD, if an 1e
  playing first chooses C1 
he will obtain qR, while choosing D1 he will get [qT+(1-q)P]. Thus, an 1e
  agent will always 
choose C1 irrespective of the level of q (recall that an 1e
  agent prefers R over T), while a 
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1e
 agent will choose D1 irrespective of the level of q. That is, we find the same result as for 
complete information. In other words, the asymmetry of information plays no role in this 
game. If we now compare the expected payoffs of a 1e
 -agent and an 1e
 -agent, knowing that 
they have both a probability ½ of playing first, we get 1( )E e qR
   and 1( ) (1 )E e qT q P
    . 
Since  1 1( ) ( )E e E e
   regardless of q we can write: 
 
Proposition 5 
In a Kantian SPD with incomplete information concerning agents' type, no population 
containing a proportion 1> q > 0 of e  type agents can be evolutionary stable. 
 
That is, as long as moral agents (in Kant’s sense) and amoral agents coexist the 
population will not be evolutionary stable. Kantian moral agents will systematically loose 
compared to amoral agents and Kantian morality will be progressively abandoned. The reason 
is that, as in complete information, moral agents ( e  agents) cooper systematically (recall 
remark 1), while amoral ( e  agents) defect systematically (and this implies a higher monetary 
payoff for amoral agents). Thus, the only situation where Kantian behavior can lead to global 
cooperation is when all agents are moral ( e  agents), the situation assumed by Sugden (1991) 
and promoted by Kant himself. 
 
5. Indirect evolution with incomplete information about the partner’s type and 
imperfect type detection 
 
In the previous sections we have shown that, within Kropotkin’s SPD, generalized 
cooperation will be the outcome if agents are able to identify their opponent’s type, while 
cooperative behavior will disappear if they are unable to do so. We will now analyze the 
outcome if some agents are able to identify their opponent (informed players I), while others 
are not capable to find out the type of their partners (uninformed players U). The share of 
informed players will be denoted by l and that of uniformed players by (1-l). However, since 
finding out the moral type of the opponent is a difficult task we assume that informed players 
are only able to obtain an imperfect signal about the type of their counterpart. We assume that 
if the agent playing second is moral ( e ), the imperfectly informed player playing first (in the 
case of the second player this information is irrelevant) gets a signal indicating that his partner 
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is moral with probability    and a signal indicating that he is amoral with probability 
(1 )  . If the second player is e , the informed player gets a signal indicating an amoral 
agent with probability    and a signal indicating a moral agent with probability (1 )  . In 
order to have a meaningful detection technology we require 1/ 2 , 1    . To obtain this 
information the informed player has a fix cost 0F  , which we assume lower than the level 
0F  defined in the Appendix (above which no agents would use the detection technology). 
Informed players use this information to update their prior beliefs using Bayes’s rule.  
This ‘detection technology’ is similar to the one proposed in Güth and Kliemt (1998) 
and Güth et al. (2000) and includes all kind of means to obtain information, such as the 
physical aspect of the opponent, his or her look, asking a given set of questions, hiring 
detective services, etc. In fact, most emerging social groups set up a given set of signs to 
facilitate the detection of other agents with the same type of religion, social preference and, 
why not, moral predispositions. This practice has been the case with more or less secret 
societies (e.g. the masons), which imply a set of moral conducts, but also with religions (e.g. 
the first Christians in the times of Rome), which do also imply a moral code. That is, the type 
of detection technology that we are postulating can be seen as an imperfect way to detect 
people of a given moral code, maybe asking them a few questions which are supposed to be 
know only by this particular type of morality. Of course, and as is obvious from the examples 
just given, these kind of ‘technologies’ are imperfect by their own nature.  
What we have now is actually a system where agents can be moral or amoral and, at 
the same time, informed or uninformed. Both characteristics evolve in an indirect evolution 
framework. This system can be shown (see Appendix) to follow the phase-diagram in figure 
(8) or the phase diagram in figure (9) depending upon the relationship between ( )R P    
and (1 )( )T P   . If ( )R P    > (1 )( )T P    the system follows figure (8) and if this 
relation is reversed the system follows figure (9). That is, we have to compare (i) the 
probability of correctly detecting a moral agent    times the net reward of mutual 
cooperation over mutual defection ( )R P with (ii) the probability of getting a sign of 
morality from an amoral agent (1 )   times the net benefit of treating as compared to 
mutual defection ( )T P . That is, the better our detecting technology is, the closer we are 
from figure (8) and, the higher the reward of treason as compared to mutual cooperation is, 
the closer we are from figure (9). 
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   Figure (8) First phase-diagram for Kropotkin’s SPD with imperfect type detection 
 
 
    Figure (9) Second phase-diagram for Kropotkin’s SPD with imperfect type detection 
 
The dynamics described in figures (8) and (9) can be summarized as follows (the expressions 
for the limits 3A  and 4A  can be found in the Appendix; below, respectively above, these 
limits informed and uninformed agents behave in the same manner):  
i. Above the limit 4A  and under 3A  agents behave as uniformed agents (see section 4). If the 
initial point is above 4A  this will eventually bring the population to the region discussed 
next, since the number of moral agents will tend to decrease. If the initial population of 
moral agents is below 3A  general defection will be the outcome (see section 4). 
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ii. In the region below 4A  and above P/R, the system will perpetually cycle around the 
degenerated rest point ( *, *)l q , see Appendix. That is, the number of moral agents will 
constantly change, but they will not disappear. In this region uninformed moral agents will 
cooperate (see section 4) and informed moral agents will also cooperate if they receive a 
signal e  (see Appendix). Thus, cooperative behavior will not disappear.  
iii. In the region below P/R and above 3A , the behavior of the system depends upon the 
relationship between ( )R P    and (1 )( )T P   . If ( )R P    > (1 )( )T P   , 
figure (8), starting in this region moral agents will tend to increase. Informed agents will 
cooperate in this region if they receive a e  signal (see Appendix), while uninformed 
agents will not cooperate (see section 4). However, the increase in moral agents will 
eventually allow the system to reach the region discussed in (ii). If ( )R P    < 
(1 )( )T P   , figure (9), moral agents will tend to disappear and the lower region 
discussed in (i) will eventually be reached.  
 
In the previous section we have shown that in Kropotkin’s SPD with incomplete 
information moral agents will not disappear, but that they will become such a minority that 
even moral agents will choose to betray, so that cooperative behavior will disappear. 
Including an imperfect detection technology we have shown the conditions under which, not 
only moral agents do not disappear, but cooperative behavior does also not disappear. Thus: 
 
Proposition 6 
In Kropotkin’s SPD with incomplete information and imperfect type detection, and starting 
from a significant number of moral agents [ 3q A  if ( ) (1 )( )R P T P 
      and 
/q P R  if ( ) (1 )( )R P T P      ], moral agents ( e ) will not disappear and 
cooperative behavior will also not disappear. 
 
Proof: see Appendix and figures (8) and (9).  
 
Nevertheless, as the streamlines in figures (8) and (9) show the equilibrium of the 
system is a vortex. Thus, we have an unstable equilibrium and no proportion of moral agents 
will be evolutionary stable (except if the initial population of moral and informed agents is 
precisely the vortex).  
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Analyzing the impact of an imperfect detecting technology in the Kantian SPD has no 
interest, since cooperation is not achieved neither under complete nor under incomplete 
information. That is, even with an imperfect detection technology moral agents will tend to 
disappear and cooperative behavior will disappear with them.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
With complete information, Kropotkin´s mutual-aid concept implies a strategic 
behavior whose main features are similar to the Tit For Tat strategy. Cooperation is a rational 
choice and cooperation is answered with cooperation, yielding an evolutionary stable situation 
where all agents follow Kropotkin’s moral and cooperate. However, applying Kant’s moral 
rules, and assuming cooperation as a duty, generalized defection is the outcome. In other 
words, morality can be the solution to the Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma as long as the 
cooperative behavior is seen as a strategic choice (Kropotkin) and not as an intangible duty 
imposed to individuals (Kant).  
When information is not complete, selfish behavior is the best way of protecting 
oneself against non-cooperative behaviors and cooperation will not be achieved with any of 
the moral concepts discussed in this paper. However, if some agents are able to detect the 
moral type of their partners, and even if this detection is not perfect, moral agents in 
Kroportkin’s sense will not disappear if they are sufficiently important in the initial 
population, and cooperative behavior will also not disappear. This does not apply to moral 
agents in Kant’s sense, since they will tend to disappear in all the environments considered, 
and cooperative behavior will vanish with them. 
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Appendix1
In Kropotkin’s SPD with incomplete information and imperfect detection
type, the probability of receiving a e−signal is [μ−q + (1− q)(1− μ+)] and the a
posteriori probability of meeting a e−-type is :
μ−q
μ−q + (1− q)(1− μ+) = A1
The probability of receiving a e+ signal is [(1− μ−) q + (1− q)μ+] and the a
posteriori probability of meeting a e− type, after receiving a signal e+, is :
(1− μ−) q
(1− μ−) q + (1− q)μ+ = A2
Suppose that the informed player (I) gets a signal e−. If he cooperates the pro-
bability of being actually faced with a e− agent is A1 (expected gain : A1R). If
he does not cooperate he knows that player 2 will always betray so that the gain
will be P . Thus, he will cooperate if :
A1 >
P
R
⇐⇒ q > (1− μ
+)P
μ−(R− P ) + (1− μ+)P = A3
Suppose now that player I gets a signal e+. Defection will be chosen if :
A2 <
P
R
⇐⇒ q < μ
+P
(1− μ−)(R− P ) + μ+P = A4
Remark that with 1 > q > 0 and 1/2 < μ−, μ+ ≤ 1 we have 1 > A1 > A2 > 0 or
0 < A3 < A4 < 1.
It is easy to show that the diﬀerentiation between informed (I) and uninfor-
med (U) agents can only take place in the region where PR ∈ (A2, A1) ⇔ q ∈
(A3, A4) . To see this, assume that an I player ignores the signal e− and does
not cooperate since A1 < P/R. Given our assumptions this implies P/R > q, so
that an U player would also not cooperate. Moreover, since A1 > A2 an I-player
should follow the e+ signal and choose defection, like an U-agent would do. The
same reasoning can be applied to the case where A2 > P/R. Thus, we focus on
the region q ∈ (A3, A4) .
The dynamics of l is calculated comparing the success of I-agents as compared
to U -agents. For q, the success of e− and e+-agents is compared. We will start
with the dynamics of the informed players (l).
The expected gain of an e1-I-type (+ or −) playing first (with probability
1/2) is EG(e1-I) = 12 {q [μ−R+ (1− μ−)P ] + (1− q)μ+P} − F . The expected
1The resolution method is similar to the one used in Güth et al. (2000).
1
gain of a e1-U-type (+ or −) playing first (with probability 1/2) depends on the
level of q. For q > P/R the first player will cooperate and get EG(e1-U) = 12qR. If
q < P/R he will defect and get EG(e1-U) = 12P. The benefit of a e
+
1 -U-type and a
e+1 -I-type (or a e
−
1 -U-type and a e
−
1 -I-type) is the same, since the benefit depends
only on the moral type, and not on the fact of being informed or uninformed.
For q < P/R we have :
EGI(q) > EGU(q)⇐⇒ q >
(1− μ+)P + 2F
(1− μ+)P + μ− (R− P ) = q1
and for q > P/R :
EGI(q) > EGU(q)⇐⇒ q <
μ+P − 2F
(1− μ−) (R− P ) + μ+P = q2
Thus, q1 < q < q2 with
F <
P (R− P ) (μ+ + μ− − 1)
2R
= F0
That is, the detection cost have to be lower than the limit (F0) since otherwise
agents would never use this detection technology. We will assume that this condi-
tion is checked. Remark that P/R ∈ [q1, q2] and that 0 < A3 < q1 < P/R < q2 <
A4 < 1.
We postulate a linear relationship for the dynamic process l˙t = k [EGI(qt)−EGU(qt)]
where k is a positive constant. Thus l˙t > 0 if EGI(qt)−EGU(qt) > 0 and we can
write for the interval considered q ∈ (A3, A4) :
A3 < q < q1 ⇒ l˙t < 0 (1)
q1 < q < q2 ⇒ l˙t > 0 (2)
q2 < q < A4 ⇒ l˙t < 0 (3)
Let us now analyze the dynamics of the moral agents (q). The expected gain
of a e−2 -U -type agent playing second is (with probability 1/2) :
EGe−(l) = l
£
μ−R+
¡
1− μ−
¢
P
¤
+ (1− l)R for q > P/R
= l
£
μ−R+
¡
1− μ−
¢
P
¤
+ (1− l)P for q < P/R
The expected gain of a e+2 -U-type agent playing second is (with probability 1/2) :
EGe+(l) = l
£
μ+P + (1− μ+)T
¤
+ (1− l)T for q > P/R
= l
£
μ+P + (1− μ+)T
¤
+ (1− l)P for q < P/R
For q > P/R we have :
EGe−(l) > EGe+(l)⇐⇒ l >
(T −R)
μ+ (T − P )− (1− μ−) (R− P ) = l0
2
The proportion l0 is positive as long as the denominator is, i.e. if the following
condition holds :
T − P
R− P >
1− μ−
μ+
For q < P/R we obtain the reversed relation.
Let us further assume q˙t = h [EGe−(lt)− EGe+(lt)] with h a positive constant.
Hence, we have q˙t > 0 for EGe−(lt) > EGe+(lt).
For μ− (R− P ) > (1− μ+) (T − P ) we have :
0 < l < l0 and q < P/R ⇒ q˙t > 0
0 < l < l0 and q > P/R ⇒ q˙t < 0
l0 < l < 1 ⇒ q˙t > 0
Plotting this information and the information given by equations (1)-(3) we get
figure (8).
For μ− (R− P ) < (1− μ+) (T − P ) we have :
0 < l < l0 ⇒ q˙t < 0
l0 < l < 1 and q > P/R ⇒ q˙t > 0
l0 < l < 1 and q < P/R ⇒ q˙t < 0
With this information and that of equations (1)-(3) we get figure (9).
In both cases, the unique rest point is given by the solution for
³
l˙t, q˙t
´
= (0, 0).
This rest point is (l∗, q∗) = (l0, q2) . This equilibrium implies a positive proportion
of I-type agents and of e−-type agents since l0 > 0 and q2 > 0. However, this
equilibrium is a vortex (see figures (8) and (9)) and has only the degenerate
attraction set {(p∗, l∗)}, i.e. it will only be reached if the initial conditions are
precisely the equilibrium. All other starting points, above P/R and below A4, will
lead to an indefinite cycling around (l∗, q∗).
3
